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Abstract. Deep neural networks (DNNs) have a wide range of applications, and
software employing them must be thoroughly tested, especially in safety-critical
domains. However, traditional software test coverage metrics cannot be applied
directly to DNNs. In this paper, inspired by the MC/DC coverage criterion, we
propose a family of four novel test criteria that are tailored to structural features
of DNNs and their semantics. We validate the criteria by demonstrating that
the generated test inputs guided via our proposed coverage criteria are able to
capture undesired behaviours in a DNN. Test cases are generated using a symbolic
approach and a gradient-based heuristic search. By comparing them with existing
methods, we show that our criteria achieve a balance between their ability to find
bugs (proxied using adversarial examples) and the computational cost of test case
generation. Our experiments are conducted on state-of-the-art DNNs obtained
using popular open source datasets, including MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet.
Keywords: neural networks, test criteria, test case generation
1 Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI), specifically deep neural networks (DNNs), can deliver human-
level results in some specialist tasks. There is now a prospect of a wide-scale deployment
of DNNs in safety-critical applications such as self-driving cars. This naturally raises
the question how software implementing this technology should be tested, validated and
ultimately certified to meet the requirements of the relevant safety standards [1].
Research and industrial communities worldwide are taking significant efforts towards
the best practice for the safety assurance for learning-enabled autonomous systems.
Among all efforts, we mention a few, including a proposal under consideration by IEEE
to form an official technical committee for verification of autonomous systems [2], the
Assuring Autonomy International Programme [3] which investigates the certification of
learned models, etc. Moreover, as stated in [4], the machine learning algorithm should be
verified with an appropriate level of coverage. This paper develops a technical solution
to support these efforts.
The industry relies on testing as a primary means to provide stakeholders with in-
formation about the quality of the software product or service [5]. Research in software
testing has resulted in a broad range of approaches to assess different software critical-
ity levels (comprehensive reviews are given in e.g., [6,7,8]). In white-box testing, the
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structure of a program is exploited to (perhaps automatically) generate test cases. Code
coverage criteria (or metrics) have been designed to guide the generation of test cases and
evaluate the completeness of a test suite. For example, a test suite with 100% statement
coverage exercises all statements at least once. While it is arguable the extent to which
coverage ensures correct functionality, high coverage is able to increase users’ confidence
(or trust) in the program [6]. Structural coverage metrics are used as a means of assess-
ment in several high-tier safety standards, which establish both statement and modified
condition/decision coverage (MC/DC) are applicable measures. MC/DC was developed
by NASA and has been widely adopted. It is used in avionics software development
guidance to ensure adequate testing of applications with the highest criticality [9].
AI systems that use DNNs are typically implemented in software. However, (white-
box) testing for traditional software cannot be directly applied to DNNs. In particular,
the flow of control in DNNs is not sufficient to represent the knowledge that is learned
during the training phase and thus it is not obvious how to define structural coverage
criteria for DNNs [10]. Meanwhile, DNNs exhibit different ”bugs” from traditional
software. Notably, adversarial examples [11], in which two apparently indistinguishable
inputs cause contradicted decisions, are one of the most prominent safety concerns in
DNNs.
We believe that the testing of DNNs, guided by proper coverage criteria, must help
developers find bugs, quantify network robustness and analyse its internal structures.
Also, developers can use the generated adversarial examples to re-train and improve the
network. These enable developers to understand and compare different networks for any
safety related argument.
Technically, DNNs contain not only an architecture, which bears some similarity
with traditional software programs, but also a large set of parameters, which are tuned
by the training procedure. Any approach to testing DNNs needs to consider the unique
properties of DNNs, such as the syntactic connections between neurons in adjacent
layers (neurons in a given layer interact with each other and then pass information to
higher layers), the ReLU (Rectified Linear Unit) activation functions and the semantic
relationship between layers.
In this paper, we propose a novel, white-box testing methodology for DNNs. In
particular, we propose a family of four test criteria, inspired by the MC/DC test cri-
terion [12] from traditional software testing, that fit the distinct properties of DNNs
mentioned above. It is known that an overly weak criterion may lead to insufficient
testing, e.g., 100% neuron coverage [13] can be achieved by a simple test suite com-
prised of few input vectors from the training dataset, and an overly strong criterion
may lead to computational intractability, e.g., 100% safety coverage is shown in [14]
as difficult to achieve (NP-hard). Our criteria, when applied to guide test case genera-
tion, can achieve both intensive testing (i.e., non-trivial to achieve 100% coverage) and
computational feasibility. As a matter of fact, excepting the safety coverage criterion in
[14], all existing structural test coverage criteria for DNNs [13,15] are special cases of
our proposed criteria. Our criteria are the first work that is able to capture and quantify
causal relations existing in a DNN that are critical for understanding the neural network
behaviour [16,17].
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Subsequently, we validate the utility of our MC/DC variant by applying it to differ-
ent approaches to DNN testing. At first, we adopt state-of-the-art concolic testing for
DNNs [18]. Concolic testing combines concrete testing and symbolic encoding of DNNs.
Specifically, the linear programming (LP) based algorithm produces a new test case (i.e.,
an input vector) by encoding a fragment of the DNN and then optimises over an objective
that is to minimise the difference between the new and the current input vector. LP can be
solved efficiently in PTIME, so the concolic test case generation algorithms can generate
a test suite with low computational cost for small to medium-sized DNNs. Meanwhile,
we develop a gradient descent (GD) based algorithm that takes the test condition as
the optimisation objective and searches for satisfiable test cases in an adaptive manner
under the guidance of the first-order derivative of the DNNs, which is able to work with
large-scale DNNs.
Finally, we experiment with our test coverage criteria on state-of-the-art neural
networks of different sizes (from a few hundred up to millions of neurons) to demonstrate
their utility with respect to four aspects: À bug finding Á DNN safety statistics Â testing
efficiency Ã DNN internal structure analysis. Bugs here refer to adversarial examples.
2 Preliminaries: Deep Neural Networks
A (feedforward and deep) neural network, or DNN, is a tuple N = (L, T, Φ), where
L = {Lk | k ∈ {1..K}} is a set of layers, T ⊆ L× L is a set of connections between
layers and Φ = {φk | k ∈ {2, . . . ,K}} is a set of functions, one for each non-input
layer. In a DNN, L1 is the input layer, LK is the output layer and layers other than input
and output layers are called hidden layers. Each layer Lk consists of sk neurons (or
nodes). The l-th node of layer k is denoted by nk,l. Each node nk,l for 1 < k < K and
1 ≤ l ≤ sk is associated with two variables uk,l and vk,l, to record its values before
and after an activation function, respectively. The ReLU [19] is by far the most popular
activation function for DNNs, according to which the activation value of each node of
hidden layers is defined as
vk,l = ReLU(uk,l) =
{
uk,l if uk,l ≥ 0
0 otherwise
(1)
Each input node n1,l for 1 ≤ l ≤ s1 is associated with a variable v1,l and each output
node nK,l for 1 ≤ l ≤ sK is associated with a variable uK,l, because no activation
function is applied on them. We let DLk = Rsk be the vector space associated with layer
Lk, one dimension for each variable vk,l. Notably, every point x ∈ DL1 is an input.
Except for inputs, every node is connected to nodes in the preceding layer by pre-
trained parameters such that for all k and l with 2 ≤ k ≤ K and 1 ≤ l ≤ sk, we have:
uk,l = bk,l +
∑
1≤h≤sk−1
wk−1,h,l · vk−1,h (2)
where wk−1,h,l is the weight for the connection between nk−1,h (i.e., the h-th node
of layer k − 1) and nk,l (i.e., the l-th node of layer k), and bk,l is the so-called bias
for node nk,l. We note that this definition can express both fully-connected functions
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and convolutional functions. The function φk is the combination of Equations (1) and
(2). Owing to the use of the ReLU as in (1), the behavior of a neural network is highly
non-linear.
Finally, for any input, the DNN assigns a label, that is, the index of the node of
output layer with the largest value: label = argmax1≤l≤sKuK,l. Let L be the set of
labels.
Example 1. Figure 1 is a simple DNN with four layers. Its input space is DL1 = R
2
where R is the set of real numbers.
v1,1
v1,2
u4,1
u4,2
Hidden
layer
Hidden
layer
Input
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Output
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n2,3
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Fig. 1: A simple neural network
Given one particular input x, the DNN N is instantiated and we use N [x] to denote this
instance of the network. In N [x], for each node nk,l, the values of the variables uk,l and
vk,l are fixed and denoted by uk,l[x] and vk,l[x], respectively. Therefore, the activation
or deactivation of each ReLU operation in the network is also determined. We define
signN (nk,l, x) =
{
+1 if uk,l[x] = vk,l[x]
−1 otherwise (3)
The subscript N will be omitted when clear from the context. The classification label of
x is denoted by N [x].label .
Example 2. Let N be a DNN whose architecture is given in Figure 1. Assume that the
weights for the first three layers are given by W1 =
[
4 0 −1
1 −2 1
]
and W2 =
 2 3 −1−7 6 4
1 −5 9
 and
that all biases are 0. When given an input x = [0, 1], we get sign(n2,1, x) = +1, since
u2,1[x] = v2,1[x] = 1, and sign(n2,2, x) = −1, since u2,2[x] = −2 6= 0 = v2,2[x].
We remark that, for simplicity of discussion, the definition focuses on DNNs with
fully connected layers. However, as shown in our experiments, our method can also be
applied to other popular DNN structures, such as convolutional and maxpooling layers,
and sigmoid activation functions used in the state-of-the-art DNNs.
3 Adequacy Criteria for Testing DNNs
3.1 Test Coverage and MC/DC
A test adequacy criterion, or a test coverage metric, is used to quantify the degree of
adequacy to which the software is tested by a test suite with respect to a set of test
conditions. Throughout this paper, we use ”criterion” and ”metric” interchangeably.
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Our criteria for DNNs are inspired by established practices in software testing, in
particular MC/DC test criterion[12], but are designed for the specific attributes of DNNs.
MC/DC is a method of measuring the extent to which safety-critical software has been
adequately tested. At its core is the idea that if a choice can be made, all the possible
factors (conditions) that contribute to that choice (decision) must be tested. For traditional
software, both conditions and the decision are usually Boolean variables or Boolean
expressions.
Example 3. The decision
d : ((a > 3) ∨ (b = 0)) ∧ (c 6= 4) (4)
contains the conditions: (a > 3), (b = 0) and (c 6= 4). The following four test cases
provide 100% MC/DC coverage:
1. (a > 3)=false, (b = 0)=true, (c 6= 4)=false
2. (a > 3)=true, (b = 0)=false, (c 6= 4)=true
3. (a > 3)=false, (b = 0)=false, (c 6= 4)=true
4. (a > 3)=false, (b = 0)=true, (c 6= 4)=true
The first two test cases already satisfy both condition coverage (i.e., all possibilities of
the conditions are exploited) and decision coverage (i.e., all possibilities of the decision
are exploited). The other two cases are needed because, for MC/DC, each condition
should evaluate to true and false at least once, and should independently affect the
decision outcome (e.g., the effect of the first condition can be seen by comparing cases 2
and 3).
3.2 Decisions and Conditions in DNNs
Our instantiation of the concepts “decision” and “condition” for DNNs is inspired by the
similarity between Equation (2) and Equation (4) and the unique properties of DNNs.
The information represented by nodes in the next layer can be seen as a summary
(implemented by the layer function, the weights and the bias) of the information in the
current layer. For example, it has been claimed that nodes in a deeper layer represent
more complex attributes of the input [16,17].
We let Ψk ⊆ P(Lk) be a set of subsets of nodes at layer k. Without loss of generality,
each element of Ψk, i.e., a subset of nodes in Lk, represents a feature learned at layer
k. Therefore, the core idea of our criteria is to ensure that not only the presence of a
feature needs to be tested but also the effects of less complex features on a more complex
feature must be tested. We use tk = |Ψk| to denote the number of features in Ψk and
ψk,l for 1 ≤ l ≤ tk the l-th feature. It is noted that the features can be overlapping, i.e.,
ψk,l1 ∩ ψk,l2 6= ∅. We consider every feature ψk,l for 2 ≤ k ≤ K and 1 ≤ l ≤ tk a
decision and say that its conditions are those features connected to it in the layer k − 1,
i.e., {ψk−1,l′ | 1 ≤ l′ ≤ tk−1}.
The use of feature generalises the basic building block in the DNN from a single
node to a set of nodes. A single node can be represented as a singleton set. In practice,
the feature can be supported by the tensor implementation in popular machine learning
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libraries [20] and various feature extraction methods such as SIFT [21], SURF [22],
etc. To work with features, we extend the notations uk,l[x] and vk,l[x] for a node nk,l
to a feature ψk,l and write ψk,l[x] and φk,l[x] for the vectors before and after ReLU,
respectively.
Definition 1. A feature pair (ψk,i, ψk+1,j) are two features in adjacent layers k and
k + 1 such that 1 ≤ k < K, 1 ≤ i ≤ tk and 1 ≤ j ≤ tk+1. Given a DNN N , we write
O(N ) (or, simply O) for the set of its feature pairs. We may also call (ψk,i, ψk+1,j) a
neuron pair when both ψk,i and ψk+1,j are singleton sets.
Our new criteria are defined by capturing different ways of instantiating the changes
of the conditions and the decision. Unlike Boolean variables or expressions, where it
is trivial to define change, i.e., true→ false or false→ true, in DNNs there are many
different ways of defining that a decision is affected by the changes of the conditions.
Before giving definitions for “affected” in Section 3.3, we start by clarifying when a
feature “changes”.
First, the change observed on a feature can be either a sign change or a value change.
Definition 2 (Sign Change). Given a feature ψk,l and two test cases x1 and x2, the
sign change of ψk,l is exploited by x1 and x2, denoted by sc(ψk,l, x1, x2), iff
– sign(nk,j , x1) 6= sign(nk,j , x2) for all nk,j ∈ ψk,l.
Moreover, we write nsc(ψk,l, x1, x2) if
– sign(nk,j , x1) = sign(nk,j , x2) for all nk,j ∈ ψk,l.
Note that nsc(ψk,l, x1, x2) 6= ¬sc(ψk,l, x1, x2). Before preceeding to another kind
of change called value change, we need notation for value function. A value function
is denoted by g : Ψk ×DL1 ×DL1 → {true, false}. Simply speaking, it expresses the
DNN developer’s intuition (or knowledge) about what constitutes a significant change on
the feature ψk,l, by specifying the difference between two vectors ψk,l[x1] and ψk,l[x2].
We do not impose particular restrictions on the form of a value function, except that for
practical reasons, it needs to be evaluated efficiently. Here, we give a few examples.
Example 4. For a singleton set ψk,l = {nk,j}, the function g(ψk,l, x1, x2) can express
|uk,j [x1] − uk,j [x2]| ≥ d (absolute change) or uk,j [x1]uk,j [x2] > d ∨
uk,j [x1]
uk,j [x2]
< 1/d (rela-
tive change). It can also express the constraint on one of the values uk,j [x2], such as
uk,j [x2] > d (upper boundary).
Example 5. For the general case, the function g(ψk,l, x1, x2) can express the distance be-
tween two vectorsψk,l[x1] andψk,l[x2] by norm-based distances ||ψk,l[x1]−ψk,l[x2]||p ≤
d for a real number d and a distance measure Lp, or structural similarity distances such
as SSIM [23]. It can also express constraints between nodes of the same layer, such as∧
j 6=i vk,i[x1] ≥ vk,j [x1].
In general, the distance measure Lp could be L1 (Manhattan distance), L2 (Euclidean
distance), L∞ (Chebyshev distance) and so on. We remark that there is no consensus on
which norm is the best to use and, furthermore, this is likely problem-specific. Finally,
we define value change as follows.
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Definition 3 (Value Change). Given a feature ψk,l, two test cases x1 and x2, and a
value function g, the value change of ψk,l is exploited by x1 and x2 w.r.t. g, denoted by
vc(g, ψk,l, x1, x2), if
– g(ψk,l, x1, x2)=true.
Moreover, we write ¬vc(g, ψk,l, x1, x2) when the condition is not satisfied.
3.3 Covering Methods
In this section, we present a family of four methods to cover the causal changes in a
DNN that were just defined.
Definition 4 (Sign-Sign Coverage, or SS Coverage). A feature pairα = (ψk,i, ψk+1,j)
is SS-covered by two test cases x1, x2, denoted by SS(α, x1, x2), if the following condi-
tions are satisfied by the DNN instances N [x1] and N [x2]:
– sc(ψk,i, x1, x2) and nsc(Pk \ ψk,i, x1, x2);
– sc(ψk+1,j , x1, x2).
where Pk is the set of nodes in layer k.
SS coverage provides evidence that the sign change of a condition feature ψk,i
independently affects the sign of the decision feature ψk+1,j of the next layer. Intuitively,
the first condition says that the sign change of feature ψk,i is exploited using x1 and x2,
without changing the signs of other non-overlapping features. The second says that the
sign change of feature ψk+1,j is exploited using x1 and x2.
Example 6. (Continuation of Example 2) Given inputs x1 = (0.1, 0) and x2 = (0,−1),
we compute the activation values for each node as given in Table 1. Therefore, we have
sc({n2,1}, x1, x2), nsc({n2,2}, x1, x2), nsc({n2,3}, x1, x2) and sc({n3,1}, x1, x2). By
Definition 4, the feature pair ({n2,1}, {n3,1}) is SS-covered by x1 and x2.
SS coverage is close to MC/DC: instead of observing the change of a Boolean
variable (i.e., true→ false or false→ true), we observe a sign change of a feature.
However, the behavior of a DNN has additional complexity that is not necessarily
captured by a direct adoption of the MC/DC-style coverage to a DNN. Subsequently,
three additional coverage criteria are designed to complement SS coverage.
First, the sign of ψk+1,j can be altered between two test cases, even when none of
the nodes nk,i in layer k changes its sign. Note that Pk, the set of all nodes in layer k, is
also a feature and thus we write nsc(Pk, x1, x2) to express that no sign change occurs
for any of the nodes in layer k.
Definition 5 (Value-Sign Coverage, or VS Coverage). Given a value function g, a
feature pair α = (ψk,i, ψk+1,j) is VS-covered by two test cases x1, x2, denoted by
V Sg(α, x1, x2), if the following conditions are satisfied by the DNN instances N [x1]
and N [x2]:
– vc(g, ψk,i, x1, x2) and nsc(Pk, x1, x2);
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input n2,1 n2,2 n2,3 n3,1 n3,2 n3,3
(0.1, 0) 0.4 0 −0.1 (0) 0.8 1.2 −0.4 (0)
(0,−1) −1(0) 2 −1 (0) −14 (0) 12 8
sign ch. sc ¬sc ¬sc sc ¬sc sc
(0, 1) 1 −2 (0) 1 3 −2 (0) 8
(0.1, 0.1) 0.5 −0.2 (0) 0 1 1.5 −0.5 (0)
sign ch. ¬sc ¬sc ¬sc ¬sc sc sc
(0,−1) −1 (0) 2 −1 (0) −14 (0) 12 8
(0.1,−0.1) 0.3 0.2 −0.2 (0) −0.8 (0) 2.1 0.5
sign ch. sc ¬sc ¬sc ¬sc ¬sc sc
(0, 1) 1 −2 (0) 1 3 −2 (0) 8
(0.1, 0.5) 0.9 −1 (0) 0.4 2.2 0.7 2.7
sign ch. ¬sc ¬sc ¬sc ¬sc sc ¬sc
Table 1: Activation values and sign changes for the input examples in Examples 6, 7, 8,
9. An entry can be of the form v, in which v ≥ 0, or u(v), in which u < 0, v = 0, or sc,
denoting that the sign has been changed, or ¬sc, denoting that there is no sign change.
– sc(ψk+1,j , x1, x2).
Intuitively, the first condition describes the value change of nodes in layer k and
the second requests the sign change of the feature ψk+1,j . Note that, in addition to
vc(g, ψk,i, x1, x2), we need nsc(Lk, x1, x2), which asks for no sign changes for any
node at layer k. This is to ensure that the overall change to the activations in layer k is
relatively small.
Example 7. (Continuation of Example 2) Given two inputs x1 = (0, 1) and x2 =
(0.1, 0.1), by the computed activation values in Table 1, we have sc({n3,3}, x1, x2) and
all nodes in layer 2 do not change their activation signs, i.e., nsc({n2,1, n2,2, n2,3}, x1, x2).
Thus, by Definition 5, x1 and x2 (subject to certain value function g) can be used to
VS-cover the feature pair e.g., ({n2,1, n2,2}, {n3,3}).
Until now, we have seen the sign change of a decision feature ψk+1,j as the equivalent
of the change of a decision in MC/DC. This view may still be limited. For DNNs, a
key safety problem [11] related to their high non-linearity is that an insignificant (or
imperceptible) change to the input (e.g., an image) may lead to a significant change to
the output (e.g., its label). We expect that our criteria can guide test case generation
algorithms towards unsafe cases, by working with two adjacent layers that are finer
than the input-output relation. We notice that the label change in the output layer is the
direct result of the changes to the activation values in the penultimate layer. Therefore,
in addition to the sign change, the change of the value of the decision feature ψk+1,j is
also important.
Definition 6 (Sign-Value Coverage, or SV Coverage). Given a value function g, a
feature pair α = (ψk,i, ψk+1,j) is SV-covered by two test cases x1, x2, denoted by
SV g(α, x1, x2), if the following conditions are satisfied by the DNN instances N [x1]
and N [x2]:
– sc(ψk,i, x1, x2) and nsc(Pk \ ψk,i, x1, x2);
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– vc(g, ψk+1,j , x1, x2) and nsc(ψk+1,j , x1, x2).
The first condition is the same as that in Definition 4. The difference is in the second
condition, which now considers the feature value change vc(g, ψk+1,j , x1, x2) with
respect to a value function g, by independently modifying one its condition features’
sign. Intuitively, SV Coverage captures the significant change of a decision feature’s
value that complements the sign change case.
Example 8. (Continuation of Example 2) Consider the feature pair ({n2,1}, {n3,2}).
Given two inputs x1 = (0,−1) and x2 = (0.1,−0.1), by the computed activation values
in Table 1, we have sc({n2,1}, x1, x2) and nsc({n2,2, n2,3}, x1, x2). If, according to
the function g, u3,2[x1]u3,2[x2] ≈ 5.71 is a significant change, i.e., g(u3,2[x1], u3,2 [x2])=true,
then the pair ({n2,1}, {n3,2}) is SV-covered by x1 and x2.
Finally, we have the following definition by replacing the sign change of the decision
in Definition 5 with value change.
Definition 7 (Value-Value Coverage, or VV Coverage). Given two value functions
g1 and g2, a feature pair α = (ψk,i, ψk+1,j) is VV-covered by two test cases x1, x2,
denoted by V V g1,g2(α, x1, x2), if the following conditions are satisfied by the DNN
instances N [x1] and N [x2]:
– vc(g1, ψk,i, x1, x2) and nsc(Pk, x1, x2);
– vc(g2, ψk+1,j , x1, x2) and nsc(ψk+1,j , x1, x2).
Intuitively, VV coverage targets scenarios in which there is no sign change for a
condition feature, but the decision feature’s value is changed significantly.
Example 9. (Continuation of Example 2) For any i ∈ {1, . . . , 3}, the feature pair
({ψ2,i}, {ψ3,3}) are VV-covered by the inputs x1 = (0, 1) and x2 = (0.1, 0.5), sub-
ject to the value functions g1 and g2. As shown in Table 1,
u3,3[x1]
u3,3[x2]
≈ 2.96, for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , 3} : nsc({n2,i}, x1, x2) and nsc({n3,3}, x1, x2).
3.4 Test Conditions, Test Suites and Test Criteria
By utilising the covering methods defined in Section 3.3, we now are able to instantiate
the test conditions, test suites and test criteria for DNNs. LetF = {SS, V Sg, SV g, V V g1,g2}
be a set of covering methods. Given a DNN N and a covering method f ∈ F , a test con-
dition set is characterised by the pair (f,O) that asks for the coverage of corresponding
causal changes on feature pairs in O according to f .
Given a DNN N , a test suite T is a finite set of inputs, i.e., T ⊆ DL1 . Ideally, we
run a test case generation algorithm to find a test suite T such that
∀α ∈ O ∃ x1, x2 ∈ T : f(α, x1, x2) (5)
In practice, we might want to compute the degree to which the test conditions are satisfied
by a generated test suite T .
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Definition 8 (Test Criterion). Given a DNN N , a test condition set by (f,O) and a
test suite T , the test criterion Mf (N , T ) is defined as follows:
Mf (N , T ) = |{α ∈ O|∃x1, x2 ∈ T : f(α, x1, x2)}||O| (6)
That is, it computes the percentage of the feature pairs that are covered by test cases
in T with respect to the covering method f .
Finally, instantiating f with covering methods in F , we obtain four test criteria
MSS (N , T ), MV Sg (N , T ), MSV g (N , T ) and MV V g1,g2 (N , T ).
4 Comparison with Existing Structural Test Criteria
So far, there have been a few proposals for structural test coverage criteria for DNNs.
In this part, we compare our criteria with them, including the safety coverage (MS )
[14], neuron coverage (MN ) [13] and several of its extensions in [15] such as neuron
boundary coverage (MNB ), multisection neuron coverage (MMN ) and top neuron
coverage (MTN ). While [13] and [14] have been authored slightly ahead of ours, our
criteria have been developed in parallel with [15].
A metric M1 is said to be weaker than another metric M2, denoted by M1 M2, iff
for any given test suite T on N , we have M1(N , T ) < 1 implies M2(N , T ) < 1. For
instance, as shown in Example 3, decision coverage and condition coverage are weaker
than MC/DC, since MC/DC cannot be covered before all decisions and conditions are
covered.
The introduction of the feature relation in this work is very powerful: 1) the criteria
in this paper are stronger than those in [13] and [15], which only consider individual
neurons’ activation statuses, and 2) it is non-trivial for the safety coverage in [14], which
is comparable to the traditional path coverage that asks to cover every program execution
path, to cover all test conditions of our criteria.
In the following, we uniformly formalise the criteria in [13,14,15] based on notations
in this paper and we will define Mf (N , T ) for f ∈ {N,S,NB,MN , TN }.
Definition 9 (Neuron Coverage). A node nk,i is neuron covered by a test case x, de-
noted by N (nk,i, x), if sign(nk,i, x) = +1.
Given the definition, the neuron coverage asks that each neuron nk,i must be activated
at least once by some test input x: sign(nk,i, x) = +1.
The neuron coverage was later generalised in [15] to cover more fine-grained neuron
activation statuses, including the boundary value for a neuron’s activation. For simplicity,
we only consider upper bounds when working with neuron boundary coverage. Given a
node nk,i and a training dataset X , we let vuk,i = maxx∈X vk,i[x] be its maximum value
over the inputs in X .
Definition 10 (Neuron Boundary Coverage). A node nk,i is neuron boundary covered
by a test case x, denoted by NB(nk,i, x), if vk,i[x] > vuk,i.
Let rank(nk,i, x) be the rank of vk,i[x] among those values of the nodes at the same
layer, i.e., {vk,j [x] | 1 ≤ j ≤ sk}.
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Definition 11 (Top Neuron Coverage). For 1 ≤ m ≤ sk, a node nk,i is top-m neuron
covered by x, denoted by TNm(nk,i, x), if rank(nk,i, x) ≤ m.
Let vlk,i = minx∈X vk,i[x]. We can split the interval Ik,i = [v
l
k,i, v
u
k,i] into m equal
sections and let Ijk,i be the jth section.
Definition 12 (Multisection Neuron Coverage). Given m ≥ 1, a node nk,i is m-
multisection neuron covered by a test suite T , denoted by MNm(nk,i, T ), if ∀1 ≤ j ≤
m∃x ∈ T : vk,i[x] ∈ Ijk,i, i.e., all sections are covered by some test cases.
Given f ∈ {N,NB, TNm} and the setH(N ) of hidden nodes in N , their associ-
ated test criterion can be then defined as follows
Mf (N , T ) = |{n ∈ H(N ) | ∃x ∈ T : f(n, x)}||H(N )| (7)
MMNm(N , T ) can be obtained by a simple adaptation.
We can fnd out that the criteria in [13,14] are special cases of our criteria (with
a suitable value function g). As an example, the “weaker than” relationship between
neuron coverage and SS coverage is proved in the lemma below.
Lemma 1. MN MSS .
Proof. Note that, for every hidden node nk,j ∈ H(N ), there exists a feature pair
({nk−1,i}, {nk,j}) ∈ O(N ) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ sk−1. Then, by Definition 4, we have
sc({nk,j}, x1, x2), which by Definition 2 means that sign(nk,j , x1) 6= sign(nk,j , x2).
That is, either sign(nk,j , x1) = +1 or sign(nk,j , x2) = +1. Therefore, if nk,j is not
covered in a test suite T1 for neuron coverage, none of the pairs ({nk−1,i}, {nk,j}) for
1 ≤ i ≤ sk−1 is covered in a test suite T2 for SS coverage.
Figure 2 gives a diagrammatic summary of the relations between all existing struc-
tural test coverage criteria for DNNs. The arrows represent the “weaker than” relations.
The complete proofs are in the appendix. As shown in Figure 2, our criteria require more
test cases to be generated than those in [13,15], and therefore can lead to more intensive
testing.
On the other hand, as indicated in Figure 2, SS coverage is weaker than safety cover-
age [14]. In [14], the input space is discretised with a set of hyper-rectangles, and then
one test case is generated for each hyper-rectangle. Such a scheme is computationally
intractable due to the high-dimensionality of DNNs. The testing approach in this paper
is more practical.
Definition 13 (Safety Coverage). Let each hyper-rectangle rec contain those inputs
with the same pattern of ReLU, i.e., for all x1, x2 ∈ rec we have sign(nk,l, x1) =
sign(nk,l, x2) for all nk,l ∈ H(N ). A hyper-rectangle rec is covered by a test case x,
denoted by S(rec, x), if x ∈ rec.
Let Rec(N ) be the set of hyper-rectangles. Then
MS (N , T ) = |{rec ∈ Rec(N ) | ∃x ∈ T : S(rec, x)}||Rec(N )| (8)
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Fig. 2: Relationship between DNN structural test criteria
5 Automated Test Case Generation
We conjecture that the criteria proposed above achieve a good balance between their
ability to guide test case generation towards relevant cases and computational cost. To
show this hypothesis, we now apply our criteria with two different test case generation
approaches for DNNs.
The test conditions required by our criteria exhibit particular combinations between
the condition feature and the decision feature, and it is not trivial to generate test
cases for them. Due to the lack of awareness of the feature relation, testing methods in
[13,14,15] cannot be directly used to generate tests for our criteria. Also, as pointed out
in [24], random test case generation is prohibitively inefficient for DNNs. Meanwhile,
the symbolic encoding in the concolic testing method in [18] is expressive enough to
encode test conditions defined by our criteria and is suitable for small to medium-sized
DNNs. Furthermore, in this section, we also present a new test case generation algorithm
based on gradient descent (GD) search, which scales to large DNNs.
5.1 Test Oracle
An oracle in software testing is a mechanism to detemine whether a test has passed or
failed. The DNN N represents a function Fˆ(x), which approximates F(x) : DL1 → L
that models perfect human perception capability. Therefore, the ultimate safety require-
ment is that for all test cases x ∈ DL1 , we have Fˆ(x) = F(x). However, such a
requirement is not practical because of the large number of inputs in DL1 and the high
cost of asking humans to label images. A pragmatic compromise, as done in many other
works including [11,25], is to use the following oracle as a proxy.
Definition 14 (Oracle). Given a finite set X of correctly labeled inputs, an input x′
passes the oracle if there exists some x ∈ X such that x and x′ are close enough and
Fˆ(x′) = Fˆ(x).
Ideally, the question of whether two inputs x and x′ are close enough is to be
answered according to the human perception. In practice, this is approximated by various
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approaches, including norm-based distance measures. Specifically, given the norm Lp
and an upper bound b for the distance, we say that two inputs x and x′ are close iff
||x − x′||p ≤ b. We write close(x, x′) for this relation. A pair of inputs that satisfies
this definition are called adversarial examples if the label assigned to them by the DNN
differs.
The choice of b is problem-specific. In our experiments, we evaluate the distribution
of adversarial examples with respect to the distance (as illustrated in Figure 4 for one of
the criteria). The use of this oracle focuses on adversarial examples in the DNN. There
may exist other ways to define a test oracle for DNNs, and our criteria are independent
from its particular definition.
5.2 Test Case Generation with LP
We first adopt the concolic testing approach in [18] to generate test cases that satisfy
the test conditions defined by our criteria. In [18], test conditions are symbolically
encoded using an linear programming (LP) model that is solved to obtain new test
cases. Specifically, the LP-based approach fixes a particular pattern of node activations
according to a given input x.
Though the overall behaviour of a DNN is highly non-linear, due to the use of e.g.,
the ReLU activation function, when the DNN is instantiated with a particular input, the
activation pattern is fixed, and this corresponds to an LP model.
LP model of a DNN instance The variables used in the LP model are distinguished in
bold. All variables are real-valued. Given an input x, the input variable x, whose value
is to be synthesized with LP, is required to have the identical activation pattern as x, i.e.,
∀nk,i : sign(nk,i,x) = sign(nk,i, x).
We use variables uk,i and vk,i to denote the values of a node nk,i before and after
the application of ReLU, respectively. Then, we have the set C1[x] of constraints to
encode ReLU operations for a network instance, where C1[x] is given as:
{uk,i ≥ 0 ∧ vk,i = uk,i | sign(nk,i, x) ≥ 0, k ∈ [2,K), i ∈ [1 . . . sk]}
∪{uk,i < 0 ∧ vk,i = 0 | sign(nk,i, x) < 0, k ∈ [2,K), i ∈ [1 . . . sk]} (9)
Note, the activation values uk,i of each node is determined by the activation values
vk−1,j of those nodes in the prior layer. This is defined as in Equation (2). Therefore, we
add the following set of constraints, C2[x], as a symbolic encoding of nodes’ activation
values.
{uk,i =
∑
1≤j≤sk−1
{wk−1,j,i · vk−1,j}+ bk,i | k ∈ [2,K), i ∈ [1 . . . sk]} (10)
The resulting LP model C[x] = C1[x] ∪ C2[x] represents a symbolic set of inputs that
have the identical activation pattern as x. Further, we can specify some optimisation
objective obj and call an LP solver to find the optimal x (if one exists). In concolic
testing, each time the DNN is instantiated with a concrete input x1, the corresponding
partial activation pattern serves as the base for the LP modeling, upon which a new test
input x2 may be found that satisfies the specified test condition.
14 Sun, Huang, Kroening, Sharp, Hill, Ashmore
5.3 Test Case Generation: a Heuristic Search
The LP optimisation in Section 5.2 provides a strong guarantee that is able to return
an input pair as long as one exists. However, its scalability depends on the efficiency
of LP solvers, and it is not trivial to apply such a testing method to large-scale DNNs
with millions of neurons. In this part, we instead develop a heuristic algorithm based on
gradient search. Note that, it has been widley shown that following gradient change is
efficient in finding bugs in DNNs and has been utilised in existing DNN testing methods
(eg., [13,15,26]). The algorithm, depicted in Algorithm 1, is used to find an input pair
Algorithm 1 get input pair(f, ψk,i, ψk+1,j)
for each x1 ∈ data set do
sample an input x2 and a positive number 
for a bounded number of steps do
if f((ψk,i, ψk+1,j), x1, x2) then return x1, x2
update 
if ¬fwiden((ψk,i, ψk+1,j), x1, x2) then x2 ← x2 −  · ∇Fˆ(x2)
else x2 ← x2 +  · ∇Fˆ(x2)
return None, None
x1, x2 such that the test condition of the covering method, f , over the feature pair,
α = (ψk,i, ψk+1,j), is satisfied; that is, f(α, x1, x2) is true. We use fwiden(α, x1, x2)
for a widened version of the testing condition f , such that all its predicates on the
features ψk,i and ψk+1,j are eliminated. It is supposed that x1 is given, and intuitively
starting from an input, x2, if feature changes other than ψk,i and ψk+1,j do not meet
the requirements of f , x2 is moved closer to x1, by following the gradient descent:
x2 ← x2 −  · ∇Fˆ(x2), as an attempt to counteract such changes. This applies to the
case when the activation sign changes on other condition features. Otherwise, the change
between x1 and x2 can only exploit a subset of predicates (in the testing condition) from
the given feature pair, and we update x2 following the gradient ascent. The algorithm’s
gradient change follows an adaptive manner that comprises of a local search to update
x2 at each step, and a simple strategy for the overall search direction to move closer or
further, with respect to x1. In our implementation, we apply the FGSM (Fast Gradient
Sign Method) [27] to initialise x2 and , and use a binary search scheme to update  at
each step.
As a heuristic, the algorithm works when there exists two inputs x1 and x2 s.t. x1 is
from the given “data set”, x2 is an input along the gradient search direction, and (x1, x2)
satisfies the specified test condition.
6 Experiments
We conduct experiments using the well-known MNIST Handwritten Image Dataset [28],
the CIFAR-10 dataset [29] on small images and the ImageNet benchmark [30] from
the large-scale visual recognition challenge. For clarity, our experiments are classified
into four classes: À bug finding Á DNN safety statistics Â testing efficiency Ã DNN
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internal structure analysis, and results will be labeled correspondingly. We also explain
the relation between our criteria and the existing ones.
In our implementation, the objective min ||x2−x1||∞ is used in all LP calls, to find
good adversarial examples with respect to the test coverage conditions. Moreover, we
use g = uk+1,j [x2]uk+1,j [x1] ≥ σ with σ = 2 for g in SV g and σ = 5 for V V g1,g2 (with respect
to g2). We admit that such choices are experimental. For generality and to speed up the
experiments, we leave the value function g1 unspecified. Providing a specific g1 may
require more effort to find an x2 (because g1 is an additional constraint), but the resulting
x2 can be better.
hidden layers MSS AESS MV Sg AEV Sg MSV g AESV g MV V g1,g2 AEV V g1,g2
N1 67x22x63 99.7% 18.9% 100% 15.8% 100% 6.7% 100% 21.1%
N2 59x94x56x45 98.5% 9.5% 100% 6.8% 99.9% 3.7% 100% 11.2%
N3 72x61x70x77 99.4% 7.1% 100% 5.0% 99.9% 3.7% 98.6% 11.0%
N4 65x99x87x23x31 98.4% 7.1% 100% 7.2% 99.8% 3.7% 98.4% 11.2%
N5 49x61x90x21x48 89.1% 11.4% 99.1% 9.6% 99.4% 4.9% 98.7% 9.1%
N6 97x83x32 100.0% 9.4% 100% 5.6% 100% 3.7% 100% 8.0%
N7 33x95x67x43x76 86.9% 8.8% 100% 7.2% 99.2% 3.8% 96% 12.0%
N8 78x62x73x47 99.8% 8.4% 100% 9.4% 100% 4.0% 100% 7.3%
N9 87x33x62 100.0% 12.0% 100% 10.5% 100% 5.0% 100% 6.7%
N10 76x55x74x98x75 86.7% 5.8% 100% 6.1% 98.3% 2.4% 93.9% 4.5%
Table 2: Coverage results on ten DNNs
(a) 9→ 8 (b) 8→ 2 (c) 1→ 7 (d) 0→ 9
Fig. 3: Selected adversarial examples for MNIST
6.1 MNIST
We randomly generate, and then train, a set of ten fully connected DNNs, such that each
network has an accuracy of at least 97.0% on the MNIST validation data. The detailed
network structure, and the number of neurons per layer, are given in Table 2. Every DNN
input has been normalised into [0, 1]28×28. Experiments were conducted on a MacBook
Pro (2.5 GHz Intel Core i5, 8 GB memory).
We apply the covering method defined in Section 3. Besides the coverage Mf , we
also measure the percentage of adversarial examples among all test pairs in the test
suite, denoted by AEf . Thanks to the use of LP optimisation, the feature in this part is
fine-grained to single neuron level. That is, each feature pair is in fact a neuron pair.
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Fig. 4: Adversarial example curves that record the accumulated percentage of adversarial
examples that fall into each distance: the adversarial distance measures the distance
between an adversarial example and the original input
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Fig. 5: SS coverage by layer: (a) the coverage level per DNN layer; (b) the detected ad-
versarial examples at each layer with respect to the total amount of adversarial examples
DNN Bug finding À The testing results, as reported in Table 2, are promising: (1)
the test case generation algorithm effectively achieves high coverage for all covering
criteria, and (2) the covering methods are considered useful, supported by the fact that
a significant portion of adversarial examples are identified. Figure 3 exhibits several
adversarial examples found during the testing with different distances. We note that,
for neuron coverage [13], a high coverage can be easily achieved by selecting a few
non-adversarial test cases that we generated.
DNN safety analysis Á The coverage Mf and adversarial example percentage AEf
together provide quantitative statistics to evaluate a DNN. Generally speaking, given
a test suite, a DNN with a high coverage level Mf and a low adversarial percentage
AEf is considered robust. In addition, we can study the adversarial quality by plotting
a distance curve to see how close the adversarial example is to the correct input. Take
a closer look into the results of SS coverage for the last three DNNs in Table 2. As
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illustrated in Figure 4, the horizontal axis measures the L∞ distance and the vertical axis
reports the accumulated percentage of adversarial examples that fall into this distance.
A more robust DNN will have its shape in the small distance end (towards 0) lower, as
the reported adversarial examples are relatively farther from their original correct inputs.
Intuitively, this means that more effort needs to be made to fool a robust DNN from
correct classification into mislabelling.
Layerwise behavior Ã Our experiments show that different layers of a DNN exhibit
different behaviors in testing. Figure 5 reports the SS coverage results, collected in
adjacent layers. In particular, Figure 5a gives the percentage of covered neuron pairs
within individual adjacent layers. As we can see, when going deeper into the DNN, it
can become harder to cover of neuron pairs. Under such circumstances, to improve the
coverage performance, the use of larger a data set is needed when generating test pairs.
Figure 5b gives the percentage of adversarial examples found at different layers (among
the overall adversarial examples). Interestingly, it seems that most adversarial examples
are found when testing the middle layers.
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Fig. 6: SS vs. SSw10. Results demonstrate that the SS coverage and its top-weight sim-
plification have similar coverage levels (MSS −MSSw10 ) and percentages of adversarial
examples (AESS −AESSw10 )
SS coverage with top weights Â For SS coverage criteria with neuron pairs, there are
totally |O| test conditions for O ⊆ O(N ). We note that |O(N )| =∑Kk=2 sk · sk−1. To
reduce the test suite size, we define O as follows: (ψk,i, ψk+1,j) ∈ O only when the
weight is one of the κ largest among {|wk,i′,j | | i′ ∈ [1 . . . sk]}. The rationale is that
condition neurons do not equally affect their decision, and those with higher (absolute)
weights are likely to have a larger influence.
Figure 6 shows the difference, on coverage and adversarial example percentages,
between SS coverage and its simplification with κ = 10, denoted by SSw10. In general,
the two are comparable. This is very useful in practice, as the “top weights” simplification
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mitigates the size of the rsulting test suite, and it is thus able to behave as a faster
pre-processing phase and even provide an alternative with comparable results for SS
coverage.
Cost of LP call Â Since LP encoding of the DNN (partial) activation pattern plays
a key role in the test generation, in this part we give details of the LP call cost, even
though LP is widely accepted as an efficient method. For every DNN, we select a set of
neuron pairs, where each decision neuron is at a different layer. Then, we measure the
number of variables and constraints, and the time t in seconds (averaged over 100 runs)
spent on solving each LP call. Results in Table 3 confirm that the LP model of a partial
activation pattern is indeed lightweight, and its complexity increases in a linear manner
when traversing into deeper layers of a DNN.
N8 N9 N10
#vars |C| t #vars |C| t #vars |C| t
L2-3 864 3294 0.58 873 3312 0.57 862 3290 0.49
L3-4 926 3418 0.84 906 3378 0.61 917 3400 0.71
L4-5 999 3564 0.87 968 3502 0.86 991 3548 0.75
L5-6 1046 3658 0.91 – – – 1089 3744 0.82
L6-7 – – – – – – 1164 3894 0.94
Table 3: Number of variables and constraints, and time cost of each LP call in test
generation
6.2 CIFAR-10
The CIFAR-10 dataset is a collection of 32x32 color images in ten kinds of objects.
Different from the MNIST case, we need to train a DNN with convolutional layers in
order to handle the CIFAR-10 image classification problem. Without loss of generality,
the activation of a node in the convolutional layer is computed by the activations of a
subset of precedent nodes, and each node belongs to a feature map in its layer. We apply
the test case generation in Algorithm 1 for the SS coverage and measure the coverage
results individually for decision features at each different layer. Overall, an SS coverage
higher than 90% is achieved with a significant portion of adversarial examples. An
interesting observation is as in Figure 7 (Ã), which shows that in this case the causal
changes of features at deeper layers are able to detect smaller perturbations of inputs that
cause adversarial behaviours, and this is likely to provide helpful feedback for developers
to debug or tune the neural network parameters. Selected adversarial examples are given
in Figure 8.
6.3 ImageNet
We applied our methods to VGG16 [31], a large-scale DNN trained on the ImageNet
dataset. The heuristic search Algorithm 1 is called to generate test cases. We consider
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Fig. 7: The averaged adversarial distance for decision features at different layers
(a) bird→ airplane (b) airplane→ cat
Fig. 8: Selected adversarial examples for CIFAR-10
each decision feature as a single set of neurons. While we can use feature extraction
methods such as SIFT [21] to obtain condition features, in our experiments we consider
each condition feature as an arbitrary set of neurons for better exploration of the testing
method. In particular, a size parameter ω is defined for the experiments such that a
feature ψk,i is required to have its size ≤ ω · sk. Recall that sk is the number of neurons
in layer k.
Different feature sizesÀÁÃ We apply SS coverage on 2,000 randomly sampled feature
pairs with ω ∈ {0.1%, 0.5%, 1.0%}. The covering method shows its effectiveness by
returning a test suite in which 10.5%, 13.6% and 14.6% are adversarial examples. We
report the adversarial examples’ average distance and standard deviation in Figure 9. The
results confirm that there is a relation between the feature pairs and the input perturbation.
Among the generated adversarial examples, a more fine-grained feature is able to capture
smaller perturbations than a coarse one.
Results in Figure 9 are measured with L∞-norm that corresponds to the maximum
changes to a pixel. We observed that, though the change of each pixel is very small,
for every adversarial example a large portion (around 50%) of pixels are changed. A
typical adversarial example image is given in Figure 10. Overall, the detected adversarial
examples are considered of high quality.
SV with neuron boundary coverage À Á As shown in Section 4, our covering methods
are stronger than neuron boundary coverage. In fact, neuron boundary is a special case
of SV coverage, when the value function of the decision feature is designed to make
the activation exceed the specified boundary value. We also validated this relation in
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Fig. 9: Adversarial distance with different feature sizes: a smaller distance corresponds
to more subtle adversarial examples
+   =
traffic light b=0.26 lipstick
Fig. 10: An adversarial example (“lipstick”) for the original traffic light input
the empirical manner, similarly to the experiments above, by generating a test suite
using SV with neuron boundary coverage. We noticed that accessing boundary activation
values is likely to request bigger changes to be made in DNNs. We set the feature size
using ω = 10% and obtain a test suite with 22.7% adversarial examples. However,
the distance of these adversarial examples, with average L∞-norm distance 3.49 and
standard deviation 3.88, is much greater than those for the SS coverage, as in Figure 9.
7 Related Work
In the following, we briefly discuss existing techniques looking to validate safety proper-
ties of DNNs.
Generation of Adversarial Examples for DNNs Most existing work, e.g., [11,27,32,33]
applies various heuristic algorithms, generally using search algorithms based on gradient
descent or evolutionary techniques. These approaches may be able to find adversarial
examples efficiently, but are not able to provide any guarantee (akin to verification) or
any certain level of confidence (akin to testing) about the nonexistence of adversarial
examples when the algorithm fails to find one.
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Testing of DNNs At present, there are only a few proposals for structural DNN test
coverage criteria. In [13], neuron coverage is proposed to cover each neuron’s binary
activation statuses. It is applied in [34] to guide the testing of DNN-driven autonomous
cars. Extensions of neuron coverage are made in [15], which include a set of test criteria
to check the corner values of a neuron’s activation and the activation levels of a subset
of neurons in the same layer. However, criteria in [13,15] simply ignore the key causal
relationship in a DNN. Odena and Goodfellow [24] apply the approximate nearest
neighbors algorithm to guide their tests generation, but it is not clear, in a DNN, what
the maximum number of nearest neighbors are. As shown in [35], quantitative DNN
coverage criteria can be applied to the design and certification of automotive systems
with deep learning components.
In [14], the input space is discretised with hyper-rectangles, and then one test case is
generated for each hyper-rectangle. The resulting safety coverage is a strong criterion, but
the generation of a test suite can be very expensive. Whilst in [36], coverage is enforced
to finite partitions of the input space, relying on predefined sets of application-specific
scenario attributes. The ”boxing clever” technique in [37] focuses on the distribution of
training data and divides the input domain into a series of representative boxes. In [38],
the difference between test dataset and training dataset is measured by quantifying the
difference between DNNs’ activation patterns.
Some traditional test case generation techniques such as concolic testing [18,39],
symbolic execution [40] and fuzzing [24,41] have been recently extended to DNNs.
Mutation testing has similarly been investigated in [42,43,44,45,46]. And metamorphic
testing [47,48,49] has been identified as a suitable test oracle for the robustness problem.
The combinatorial method is explored to reduce the testing space for DNNs in [50].
Multi-implementation testing is applied to k-Nearest Neighbor (kNN) and Naive Bayes
supervised learning algorithms in [51]. In [52], the adversarial inputs are treated as the
fairness problem via testing.
Tensorflow [20] is a popular library for developing deep learning models, and Zhang
et al [53] studied a collection of 175 bugs in Tensorflow programs. A testing framework
is developed in [54] for learning based malware detection applications in Android.
Autonomous driving is the primary application domain for assessments of DNN testing
techniques [26,55,56].
Automated Verification of DNNs The safety problem of a DNN can be reduced into
a constraint solving problem [57]. SMT [25,58,59,60], MILP [61,62,63,64,65] and
SAT [66,67] solutions have already been considered. In [68], the DNN is transformed
into into an equivalent hybrid system. These approaches typically only work with
small networks with a few hundred hidden neurons, and approximation techniques
[69,70,71,72,73,74,75] can be applied to improve the efficiency. Another thread of
work [76,77,78] based on global optimisation is promising to work with larger networks.
8 Conclusions
We have proposed a set of novel test criteria for DNNs. Our experiments on various
datasets and test case generation methods show promising results, indicating the feasibil-
ity and effectiveness of the proposed test criteria. The test coverage metrics developed
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within this paper provide a method to obtain evidence towards adversarial robustness,
which is envisaged to contribute to safety cases. The metrics are also expected to provide
additional insights for domain experts when they are considering the adequacy of a
particular dataset for use in an application.
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Appendix
This section gives the proofs for relations given in Section 4.
Lemma 2. MN MSS .
Proof. Note that, for every hidden node nk,j ∈ H(N ), there exists a feature pair
({nk−1,i}, {nk,j}) ∈ O(N ) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ sk−1. Then, by Definition 4, we have
sc({nk,j}, x1, x2), which by Definition 2 means that sign(nk,j , x1) 6= sign(nk,j , x2).
That is, either sign(nk,j , x1) = +1 or sign(nk,j , x2) = +1. Therefore, if nk,j is not
covered in a test suite T1 for neuron coverage, none of the pairs ({nk−1,i}, {nk,j}) for
1 ≤ i ≤ sk−1 is covered in a test suite T2 for SS coverage.
Lemma 3. MN MV Sg .
Proof. Follow a similar argument with Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. MN  MMNm , when the interval [vlk,i, vuk,i] is non-trivial, i.e., not [0, 0],
for all nodes nk,i ∈ H.
Proof. Because m subsections are all in [vlk,i, v
u
k,i] and [v
l
k,i, v
u
k,i] is non-trivial, we have
that the neuron coverage of a node nk,i is satisfied whenever any subsection of [vlk,i, v
u
k,i]
is filled.
We remark that the condition about the non-trivial intervals are reasonable. First of all,
in practice, all the DNNs we work with satisfy this condition. Second, if a node always
have value 0 for all the training samples then such a node can be seen as redundant.
Lemma 5. MMNm MSV g for a suitable function g.
Proof. For every hidden node, the upper bound vuk,i and lower bounds v
l
k,i are obtained
from the training samples. Therefore, for any given subsection of [vlk,i, v
u
k,i], we know
its exact interval, say [vl,jk,i, v
u,j
k,i ] for the j-th subsection. Then we can use the function g
to express that the value vk,i[x2] is in [v
l,j
k,i, v
u,j
k,i ]. The value of vk,i[x1] does not matter.
Therefore, if the subsections [vl,jk,i, v
u,j
k,i ] is not covered, we know that the feature pairs
({nk−1,j}, {nk,i}) for 1 ≤ j ≤ sk−1 have not been covered by the SV coverage under
the function g.
Lemma 6. MMNm MV V g1,g2 for a suitable function g2.
Proof. Follow a similar argument with Lemma 5.
Lemma 7. MNB MSV g for a suitable function g.
Proof. Follow a similar argument with Lemma 5, except that in this case the function g
is used to express that vk,i is greater than vuk,i.
Lemma 8. MNB MV V g1,g2 for a suitable function g2.
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Proof. Follow a similar argument as that of Lemma 7.
Lemma 9. MTNm MV V g1,g2 for a suitable function g1.
Proof. We can work with feature pairs ({nk,i, nk+1,j}) and use g1 to express that
vk,i[x2] is greater than at least sk −m values in the set {vk,l | l ∈ [1..sk]}. The value of
vk,i[x1] does not matter. Therefore, whenever the node nk,i is not top-m neuron covered
then the pair is not VV covered under the functions g1 and g2 for any g2.
Lemma 10. MTNm MV Sg for a suitable function g1.
Proof. Follow the similar argument with that of Lemma 9.
We have the following conclusion stating the relationship between safety coverage
and ours.
Theorem 1. MSS MS .
Proof. Note that, safety coverage exhaustively enumerates all possible activation patterns.
Therefore, we have MSS MS since the former only explore a subset of the activation
patterns.
